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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
IN CIRCUIT COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to the Utah Constitution Article VIII, Section 3, 
and Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(d). 
The proceedings below consist of a suit by Plaintiff 
Butterfield Lumber, Inc. ("Butterfield")# seeking from Defendants 
$4,250.00 plus interest, attorneys' fees and costs based upon 
Butterfield's supplying of materials used in the construction of a 
residence on the subject real property (the "Property"). 
Butterfield's claim against Appellant Peterson Mortgage Corporation 
("Peterson Mortgage") was confined to Butterfield's Third Claim for 
Relief seeking foreclosure of a mechanics's lien, plus attorneys' 
fees and costs. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review on this appeal are as 
follows: 
A. Whether a mechanic's lien attaches to the proceeds 
from a sale of real property to an innocent third-party purchaser 
after the lienor has failed to file a notice of "lis pendens" as 
required by Section 38-1-11, U.C.A. (1953), and has thus failed to 
preserve the lienor's "in rem" rights in the real property as 
contemplated by Section 38-1-3, U.C.A- (1953)• In deciding whether 
1 
the trial court properly granted judgment as a matter of law, the 
appellate court gives no deference to the trial court's 
construction of a statute. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, 
Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel Supply 
Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988). 
B. Whether a recorded notice of lien that was not 
properly acknowledged pursuant to Section 57-3-1, U.C.A. (1953), in 
effect at the pertinent time, perfected a mechanic's lien as 
contemplated by § 38-1-7, U.C.A. (1953). In deciding whether the 
trial court properly denied Peterson Mortgage's Motion to Dismiss 
as a matter of law in construing a statute, the appellate court 
gives no deference to the trial court's interpretation of the law. 
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc., supra; Forbes v. St. 
Mark's Hosp., 754 P.2d 933 (Utah 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The determinative constitutional provisions of the Utah 
Constitution, and the determinative statutes of the State of Utah 
read verbatim as follows: 
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 38-1-3. 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons 
performing any services or furnishing or 
renting any materials or equipment used in the 
construction, alteration, or improvement of 
any building or structure or improvement to 
any premises in any manner and licensed 
architects and engineers and artisans who have 
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furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, 
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, 
surveys or superintendence, or who have 
rendered other like professional service, or 
bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the 
property upon or concerning which they have 
rendered service, performed labor, or 
furnished or rented materials or equipment for 
the value of the service rendered, labor 
performed, or materials or equipment furnished 
or rented by each respectively, whether at the 
instance of the owner or of any other person 
acting by his authority as agent, contractor, 
or otherwise. This lien shall attach only to 
such interest as the owner may have in the 
property. 
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 38-1-7. 
(1) Every original contractor within 100 days 
after the completion of his contract, and 
except as - provided in this section, every 
person other than the original contractor who 
claims the benefit of this chapter within 80 
days after furnishing the last material or 
performing the last labor for or on any land, 
building, improvement, or structure shall file 
for record with the county recorder of the 
county in which the property, or some part of 
the property,is situated, a written notice to 
hold and claim a lien. 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement 
setting forth the following information: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if 
known or, if not known, the name of the record 
owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he was 
employed or to whom he furnished the material; 
(c) the time when the first and last 
labor was performed, or the first and last 
material was furnished ; 
(d) a description of the property, 
sufficient for identification; and 
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(e) the signature of the lien claimant or 
his authorized agent, and the date signed* 
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of 
lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail 
by certified mail to either the reputed owner 
or record owner of the real property a copy of 
the notice of lien* If the record owner's 
current address is not readily available, the 
copy of the claim may be mailed to the last-
known address of the record owner, using the 
names and addresses appearing on the last 
completed real property assessment rolls of 
the county where the affected property is 
located. Failure to deliver or mail the 
notice of lien to the reputed owner or record 
owner precludes the lien claimant from an 
award of costs and attorneys' fees against the 
reputed owner or record owner in an action to 
enforce the lien. 
(4) When a subcontractor or any person 
furnishes labor or material as stated in 
Subsections (1) through (3) at the request of 
an original contractor, then the final date 
for the filing of a notice of intention to 
hold and claim a lien for a subcontractor or a 
person furnishing labor or material at the 
request of an original contractor is 80 days 
after completion of the original contract of 
the original contractor. 
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 38-1-11. 
Actions to enforce the liens herein provided 
for must be begun within twelve months after 
the completion of the original contract, or 
the suspension of work thereunder for a period 
of thirty days. Within the twelve months 
herein mentioned the lien claimant shall file 
for record with the county recorder of each 
county in which the lien is recorded a notices 
of the pendency of the action, in the manner 
provided in actions affecting the title or 
right to possession of real property, or the* 
lien shall be void, except as to persons who 
have been made parties to the action and 
persons having actual knowledge of the 
commencement of the action, and the burden of 
4 
proof shall be upon the lien claimant and 
those claiming under him to show such actual 
knowledge. Nothing herein contained shall be 
construed to impair or affect the right of any 
person to whom a debt may be due for any work 
done or materials furnished to maintain a 
personal action to recover the same. 
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 57-1-1. 
The term "conveyanceM as used in this title 
shall be construed to embrace every instrument 
in writing by which any real estate
 r or 
interest in real estate, is created# alienedt 
mortgaged, encumbered or ^assigned, except 
wills i and leases for a term not exceeding one 
year. 
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 57-2-1. 
Every conveyance in writing whereby any real 
estate is conveyed or may be affected shall be 
acknowledged or proved and certified in the 
manner hereinafter provided. 
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 57-3-1. 
A certificate of the acknowledgment of any 
conveyance, or of the proof of the execution 
thereof as provided in this title, signed and 
certified by the officer taking the same as 
provided in this title, shall entitle such 
conveyance, with the certificate or 
certificates aforesaid, to be recorded in the 
office of the recorder of the county in which 
the real estate is situated. 
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 57-4a-l. 
Each document executed and acknowledged on or 
before July 1, 1988, may be recorded in the 
office of the county recorder regardless of 
any defect or irregularity in its execution, 
attestation, or acknowledgment. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Butterfield filed suit April 6, 1988, seeking $4,250.00 
plus interest, attorneys' fees and costs based upon Butterfield 
supplying materials used in the construction of a residence on the 
Property. Butterfield's claim against Peterson Mortgage was 
confined to Butterfield's Third Claim for Relief, which sought only 
foreclosure of Butterfield's claimed mechanic's lien (the 
"Mechanic's Lien"), plus attorneys' fees and costs. By its Third 
Claim for Relief, Butterfield claimed that the Mechanic's Lien had 
priority over Peterson Mortgage's trust deed (the "Trust Deed") on 
the Property, which Trust Deed had been recorded one hour and 38 
minutes after Butterfield first supplied materials for use in 
improving the Property. 
Peterson Mortgage filed a timely motion to dismiss (the 
"Motion to Dismiss") based upon Butterfield's failure to have its 
Notice of Mechanic's Lien (the "Notice") acknowledged cis required 
by § 57-3-1 (1953). The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss 
pursuant to its written Decision of June 28, 19 89. 
Butterfield then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (the 
"Motion for Summary Judgment"), requesting the Court to determine 
that the Lien had priority over the Trust Deed and ordering 
Peterson Mortgage to pay Butterfield the principal amount of 
Butterfield's claim, plus interest, attorneys' fees and costs. 
Peterson Mortgage opposed the Motion for Summary Judgment because 
6 
after that time Peterson Mortgage owned no interest in the 
Property, Butterfield had failed to file and record a notice of 
"lis pendens' with respect to this action, and the Mechanic's Lien 
did not attach to any proceeds from the sale of the Property to 
anyone. The trial court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment 
pursuant to its written Memorandum Decision of March 1, 1990. 
After issuing a subsequent written Memorandum Decision of 
June 15,*. 1990, modifying its earlier decision with respect to the 
amount of principal, interest and attorneys fees recoverable by 
Butterfield from Peterson Mortgage, the trial court entered its 
Order and Judgment on July 12, 1990, requiring Peterson Mortgage to 
pay to Butterfield the principal amount of $4,043.80, plus 
interest, attorneys' fees and costs as stated in the Order and 
Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
No genuine issue of fact exists as to any of the 
following material facts. All references in this Brief of 
Appellant are to pages in the record on appeal. Copies of the 
Decision dated June 28, 1989, Memorandum Decision dated March 1, 
1990, Memorandum Decision dated June 15, 1990, and Order and 
Judgment dated July 12, 1990, are included in the Addendum. 
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1» Butterfield supplied building materials for the 
construction of a private residence, whose owner and contractor 
failed to pay for the materials. (Record at 237). 
2. Neither the owner of the Property nor the contractor 
paid Butterfield the $4,043.80 owed to Butterfield for such 
materials. (Record at 237.) 
3. Peterson Mortgage was the primary construction 
lender with respect to the Property, which loan was secured by the 
Trust Deed. (Record at 237.) 
4. The owner executed a December 31, 1986 promissory 
note in favor of Peterson Mortgage in the principal amount of 
$155,000. 00, which note was secured by the Trust Deed of even date. 
(Record at 106, 238). 
5. Construction work on the Property began on January 
9, 1987, at 3:00 p.m., and Peterson Mortgage recorded the trust 
Deed on January 9, 1987, at 4:38 p.m. (Record at 238) . 
6. On June 18, 1987, Butterfield caused the Notice to 
be recorded, which Notice had not been acknowledged. (Record at 
35, 238). 
7. On April 6, 1988, Butterfield filed this action 
seeking, among other relief, foreclosure of Peterson Mortgage's 
interest in the Property. (Record at 2 38). 
8. At no time pertinent hereto has Butterfield filed 
for record a "lis pendens" as contemplated by § 38-L-ll U.C.A. 
(1953) . (Record at 134). 
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9. On August 15, 1988 pursuant to a non- judicial 
foreclosure under the Trust Deed the Property was sold to Leon 
Peterson, an individual. (Record at 238). 
10. At all times pertinent hereto, Leon Peterson was 
president of Peterson Mortgage. (Record at 238-39). 
11. On January 13, 1989, Leon Peterson sold the property 
to Peter H. Wright-Clark ("Wright-Clark-), who had no constructive 
or actual notice of the pendency of this action. (Record at 239). 
12. The date on which the last materials were furnished 
by Butterfield to the property was April 10, 1987. (Record at 
134). 
13. Wright-Clark acquired the Property over 21 months 
after materials were last delivered by Butterfield to the Property, 
and over nine months after Butterfield was required to have filed 
any notice of lis pendens which could have affected Wright-Clark's 
interest in the Property. (Record at 135). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Butterfield, as the one-time owner of a mechanic's 
lien in the Property, has no rights to any proceeds from the sale 
of the Property, because § Section 38-1-3 states that any lien held 
by Butterfield could only attach to the Property rather than any 
proceeds of sale of the Property. Peterson Mortgage sold the 
Property to Leon Peterson, and Leon Peterson sold the Property to 
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Wright-Clark, an innocent third-party purchaser. Wright-Clark was 
an innocent third-party purchaser because Butterfield failed to 
preserve its rights in the Property as contemplated by § 38-1-3 by 
failing to file a notice of lis pendens cis required by § 38-1-11. 
Under the circumstances, the foreclosure of any interest of 
Peterson Mortgage in and to the Property as alleged in the Third 
Claim for Relief was moot. At the same time, Butterfield no longer 
had any cause of action against Peterson Mortgage because the Lien 
had been extinguished when title passed to Wright-Clark. Upon such 
extinction of the Lien, no security interest survived to attach to 
any other real or personal property owned by Peterson Mortgage or 
anyone else. Therefore, the trial court erred in aLwarding any 
unpled person judgment against Peterson Mortgage. 
II. Because the Notice was not acknowledged pursuant to 
§ 57-3-1, U.C.A., in effect at the pertinent time, it was not 
entitled to recordation and was void. Accordingly, the Trust Deed 
had priority over the Lien and the trial court erred by failing to 
grant the Motion to Dismiss. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE BDTTERFIELD FAILED TO TIMELY FILE A 
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS AS CONTEMPLATED BY § 38-
1-11, THE LIEN WAS EXTINGUISHED, AND UNDER § 
38-1-3 BUTTERFIELD HAD NO LIEN ON ANY PROCEEDS 
FROM THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY. 
Section 38-1-11, U.C.A., provides in its entirety as 
follows: 
Actions to enforce the liens herein 
provided for must be begun within twelve 
months after the completion of the original 
contract, or the suspension of work thereunder 
for a period of thirty days. Within the 
twelve months herein mentioned the lien 
claimant shall file for record with the county 
recorder of each county in which the lien is 
recorded a notice of the pendency of the 
action, in the manner provided in actions 
affecting the title or right to possession of 
real property, or the lien shall be void, 
except as to persons who have been made 
parties to the action and persons having 
actual knowledge of the commencement of the 
action, and the burden of proof shall be upon 
the lien claimant and those claiming under him 
to show such actual knowledge. Nothing herein 
contained shall be construed to impair or 
affect the right of any person to whom a debt 
may be due for any work done or materials 
furnished to maintain a personal action to 
recover the same. [Emphasis added.] 
The Supreme Court has explained that "Mechanics' liens 
are statutory creatures unknown to the common law. . . . Although 
liens and pleadings arising under the statute will be liberally 
construed to effect the desired object, compliance with the statute 
is required before a party is entitled to the benefits created by 
11 
the statute." AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Developmentr 714 P.2d 
289, 291 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted). 
The only relief pled by Butterfield against Peterson 
Mortgage was.to foreclose the Mechanic's Lien, pursuant to which 
claim Butterfield merely sought to foreclose Peterson Mortgage's 
interest in the property. However, by virtue of the trial court's 
decision, Butterfield ended up "foreclosing" a wholly different 
kind of lien, not a creature of statue or the common law. At the 
time of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Peterson Mortgage no 
longer had any interest in the Property, the Property having been 
conveyed to Wright-Clark as of January 13, 1989. Because such 
conveyance took place without any notice of lis pendens being of 
record, according to § 38-1-11, U.C.A., the Mechanic's Lien 
Butterfield sought to foreclose against Peterson Mortgage was void 
because Wright-Clark had no notice of this action. Because 
Peterson Mortgage had no interest in the Property and the 
Mechanic's Lien was void as to Wright-Clark, the foreclosure of any 
interest of Peterson Mortgage in and to the Property was moot, and 
Butterfield no longer had any cause of action against Peterson 
Mortgage because the Mechanic's Lien did not exist. 
Further, upon such extinction of the Mechanic's Lien, the 
Mechanic's Lien did not survive to attach to any other real or 
personal property of Peterson Mortgage. This is clear from § 38-1-
3, U.C.A., which provides in its entirety as follows: 
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Contractors, subcontractors, and all 
persons performing any services or furnishing 
or renting any materials or equipment used in 
the construction, alteration, or improvement 
of any building or structure or improvement to 
any premises in any manner and licensed 
architects and engineers and artisans who have 
furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, 
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, 
surveys or superintendence, or who have 
rendered other like professional service, or 
bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the 
Property upon or concerning which they have 
rendered service, performed labor, or 
furnished or rented materials or ..equipment for 
the value of the service rendered, labor 
performed, or materials or equipment furnished 
or rented by each respectively, whether at the 
instance of the owner or of any other person 
acting by his authority as agent, contractor, 
or otherwise. This lien shall attach only to 
such interest as the owner may have in the 
Property. [Emphasis added.] 
The foregoing section clearly provides that the statutorily created 
Mechanic's Lien attached only to an interest in the property 
itself, which is the real property upon or concerning which 
Butterfield "furnished or rented materials or equipment." 
Butterfield did not render service, perform labor or furnish or 
rent materials or equipment upon or concerning the proceeds from 
any sale of the Property. In other words, other than the Property, 
the Mechanic ' s Lien did not attach to any real or personal property 
owned by anyone. 
We know of no case, when confronted with the clear 
language of the last sentence of our § 38-1-3, that holds that a 
mechanic's lien on real property is somehow converted to a lien on 
the proceeds of any sale of such real property. Whatever lien 
13 
Butterfield had, and according to § 38-1-3 it was a lien only in 
and to the owner's interest in the Property, was lost when the 
Property was conveyed to the innocent third-part purchaser and 
Butterfield had not filed any notice of lis pendens with respect to 
this action. Clearly, even if we resort to ignoring the clear 
language of § 38-1-3 in favor of a "balancing of equities," which 
Butterfield urged before the trial court, such "balancing of 
equities" favors Peterson Mortgage for the simple reason that 
Butterfield could have protected itself fully by filing the notice 
of lis pendens contemplated by § 38-1-11. Having failed to do so, 
how can Butterfield now be heard to say that the risk of loss 
should be born by Peterson Mortgage, whose only mistake was that it 
failed to record its Trust Deed until an hour and 38 minutes after 
work had commenced on the Property, On the other hand, Butterfield 
had until April 10, 1989, or approximately 15 months later, to 
protect its interest in the Property. Butterfield failed to do so 
by the simple expedient of routinely filing a notice of lis pendens 
with respect to this action. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in granting 
Butterfield's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
14 
POINT II 
A NOTICE OF MECHANIC'S LIEN NOT PROPERLY 
ACKNOWLEDGED PURSUANT TO S 57-3-1, IN EFFECT 
AT THE PERTINENT TIME, DID NOT PERFECT THE 
MECHANIC'S LIEN. 
A. Because the Notice was not acknowledged. it was not 
entitled to recordation and was void. 
Section 57-3-1, U.C.A., provides in its entirety as 
follows: 
-A certificate of the acknowledgement of 
any conveyance, or of the proof of the 
execution thereof as provided in this title, 
signed and certified by the officer taking the 
same as provided in this title, shall entitle 
such conveyance, with the certificate or 
certificates aforesaid, to be recorded in the 
office of the recorder of the county in which 
the real estate is situated. 
The Notice was not acknowledged as required by § 57-3-1. Lacking 
an acknowledgment, a recording is void and of no effect. Doris 
Trust Company v. Guermbach, 103 Utah 120, 133 P.2d 1003 (1943); see 
also Wvcalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 826 (Utah 
App. 1989); General Glass Corp. v. Mast Const. Co., 766 P.2d 429 
(Utah App. 1988) (general requirements of acknowledgement); 
Mickelsen v. Craiqco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561 (Utah 1989) (outlining 
what constitutes compliance with statute). 
Acknowledgments are not mere technicalities, to be 
dispensed with when convenient. As stated by the Supreme Court of 
Idaho: 
We believe that the manifest intent of the 
legislature in requiring a notary public to 
execute a certificate of acknowledgment is to 
15 
provide protection against the recording of 
false instruments. The sine qua non of this 
statutory requirement is the involvement of 
the notary, a public officer in a position of 
public trust. 
Benjamin Franklin Savings & Loan Association v. New Concept Realty 
and Development, Inc., 107 Idaho 711, 692 P.2d 355 (1984), quoting 
Farm Bureau Finance Company, Inc. v. Carney, 100 Idaho 745, 605 
P.2d 509 (1980). 
B. The 1989 amendment to the Mechanic's Lien statute did not 
amend § 57-3-1, which requires an acknowledgment prior to 
recording and thus the Mechanic's Lien was not perfected. 
The 1989 amendment to § 38-1-7, validating notices 
unaccompanied by acknowledgements filed between April 29, 1985, 
through April 24, 1989, did not amend the Utah Recording Act at § 
57-3-1 or modify its requirements. Such amendment, House Bill 62, 
dealt only with U.C.A. § 38-1-7 — the Mechanic's Lien statute. 
When the Notice was recorded by Butterfield, the recording statute 
provided that an acknowledgment, or certificate thereof, was 
essential for a valid recording. Inasmuch as House Bill 62 did not 
specifically exempt mechanic's liens from the requirements of the 
Recording Act, an acknowledgment is still an essential prerequisite 
to recordation. Thus, the Notice was invalidly recorded and must 
be treated as a nullity for failure to comply with Utah law. Since 
the Notice was void as a matter of law, the Notice failed to timely 
perfect the Mechanic's Lien as required by § 3 8-1-7. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
Butter field has no lien upon or any other rights in 
Peterson Mortgage's proceeds of the sale of the Property, nor did 
Butterfield have a perfected lien on the Property itself. 
Therefore, the trial court erred by: (1) granting the Motion for 
Summary Judgment; and (2) failing to grant the Motion to Dismiss. 
Accordingly, the Order and Judgment should be reversed and the case 
remanded to the trial court with instructions to dismiss this 
action as to Peterson Mortgage and award Peterson Mortgage its 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred herein. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of October, 1990. 
James ft. Thompson 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
\JLT\P\104 
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ADDENDUM 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
DECISION — dated June 28, 1989 
MEMORANDUM DECISION — dated March 1, 1990 
MEMORANDUM DECISION — dated June 15, 1990 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT — dated July 12, 1990 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant were served this 26th day of October, 
1990 by mailing the same by first-class, United States mail, 
postage prepaid, to: 
David K. Broadbent (#0442) 
Thomas M. Melton (#4999) 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PETERSEN MORTGAGE INC. 
JOHN L. McCLOY dba McCLOY 
CONSTRUCTION, JAMES A. 
ARROWSMITH, GAYLE Z. ARROWSMITH 
CORPORATION, IDEAL CONCRETE 
CORPORATION, REID'S CONCRETE 
SERVICE, INC., DAVIS BROS. 
CABINET MAKERS, INC., and JOHN 
DOE I, 
Defendants. 
This is a motion to dismiss by defendant Petersen 
Mortgage Inc. The critical issue in this matter is the 
authority of the County Recorder to receive a document for 
recording that has not been acknowledged. 
The plaintiff filed a notice to claim a lien in accord 
with the required procedures (32-1-7 UCA 1953) on June 17, 
1987 • Petersen claims that at the time of filing, all 
documents that affected real property were required to be 
acknowledged (57-2-1 UCA 1953, repealed on July 1, 1988) to be 
received for recordation by the County Recorder (57-3-1 UCA 
1953) , That without an acknowledgment the document in 
question should not have been received by the recorders 
office, and that the recorder acted ultra vires, thus making 
the notice of lien void and of no legal effect. 
D E C I S I O N 
C i v i l No . 8 8 3 0 0 3 8 2 5 CV 
A review of the statutory authority of the County 
Recorder (Section 17-21-et seq. UCA 1953) , finds no 
prohibiting language that limits the receiving of 
non-acknowledged documents. Section 57-3-1 UCA 1953 as 
amended bestows a right to record a conveyance or document if 
acknowledged but does not directly or by implication prohibit 
the recording of an unacknowledged document (Section 57-3-3 
UCA, 1953 limits the effect of a document that is not recorded 
according to Title 57 to subsequent purchasers, etc) 
The 1988 Legislature enacted Section 57-4a-2 UCA 1953, 
which dictated that the contents of a recorded document 
imparted notice regardless of an omission of an 
acknowledgment. This recent amendment to the code appears to 
allow the pratical effect of recording even though the 
document does not meet the full statutory requirements. This 
seems to satisfy the over-riding purpose of Section 38-1-7 UCA 
1953 which is to notify all interested parties in the named 
property of an intention to perfect a lien. 
The court concludes that the county recorder did not 
commit an ultra vires act when it received and recorded 
plaintiff's notice of the intention to claim a lien, and that 
Section 57-4a-2 UCA, 1953 ratified the effectiveness of that 
notice. The present action is a continuation of the 
requirements to establish the lien rights of the plaintiff in 
the subject property. The action against the defendant is 
essential to determine the priority rights of all the parties 
in the real estate in question 
Therefore/ the court denies defendants motion to 
dismiss and allows 10 days for the defendant to file its 
answer. 
Dated this day of June, 1989. 
Paul G. Grant / 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Decision was mailed, postage, prepaid to Thomas M. 
Melton, Attorney at Law, City Centre I, Suite 900, 175 E 400 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 and Kent B. Linebaugh, 
Attorney at Law, 370 East South Temple, Suite 400, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84111 this off day of June, 1989, 
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
PETERSON MORTGAGE CORP. ] 
Defendant. 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) Case No. 883003825 CV 
Plaintiff has moved the Court to determine the legal 
liability of a specific defendant, Peterson Mortgage Company-
The plaintiff, Butterfield Lumber, supplied building materials 
for the construction of a private residence and perfected a 
mechanics lien on the property when the owner and contractor 
failed to pay for the materials. The defendant, Peterson 
Mortgage, is the primary lender whose financial interest is 
protected by a trust deed-
The owner has filed for bankruptcy and the general 
contractor (who has since passed away) are defendants in this 
action. This motion does not ask for a determination as to 
their liability. 
The plaintiff requests that the court require defendant 
Peterson Mortgage Corporation to pay over to it the amount 
claimed in the notice of lien ($4,240.73) because its lien has 
priority over the defendants trust deed. 
93"? 
Defendant Peterson moves the court for an order 
dismissing Plaintttiffs "in rem" action against it on the 
grounds that plaintiff failed to file a lis pendens within the 
time required by law (31-1-11 IKC.A* 1953) , therefore 
forfeiting its rights in the property and any claim against 
Petersen. 
As between these two parties the following facts appear 
to be undisputed. 
The owners of the property executed a promissory note 
secured by a trust deed payable to Petersen on December 31, 
1986. Construction work began on a new residence on the 
property on January 9, 1987 at 3:00 p.m, 1953, - Peterson filed 
its trust deed with the recorders office on January 9, 1987 at 
4:38 p.m. Plaintiff issued its Notice of Lien within the 
statutory time as required by Section 38-1-7 U.C.A. 1953, by 
filing a notice of lien with the County Recorders office on 
June 18, 1987 and mailing a copy of the notice to the 
registered owners on the 24th of June, 1987. This action was 
commenced in April, 1988 and defendant Petersen was served on 
April 9, 1988. 
On April 11, 1988 the trustee of the trust deed gave 
notice of default and election to sell to all parties of 
record. After soliciting bids and conducting a public sale 
the trustee conveyed the property to Leon Petersen as an 
individual in August 1988. Leon Peterson is president and 
-2-
2$ 
registered agent of the defendant, Peterson Mortgage Corp, 
Both parties agree that Peterson Mortgage and Leon Peterson, 
had actual notice of plaintifffs claim and lien, Peterson 
does not dispute the amount of the debt claimed by Plaintiff, 
and both parties agree that this is an "in rem" action not an 
"in personam" claim as to this specific defendant. 
On January 13, 1989 Leon Peterson sold the property to 
the present owner, Peter H. Wright-Clark, who had no 
constructive or actual notice of this action. 
The parties to this motion agree that Plaintiff may not 
foreclose on the real property because of the failure to file 
a lis pendens as required by Section 38-1-11 U.C.A. 1953 nor 
may it proceed against the present owner. 
A careful review of Utah cases reveals that this case 
presents a novel issue. The question that is controlling is; 
"Does a lienholder have rights in the proceeds of a trust deed 
sale after the lienor has failed to preserve its "in rem" 
rights in the specific property by failing to file a "lis 
pendens"?" 
The applicable parts of the mechanics lien statute are 
as follows: 
-3-
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. •. All persons .. • furnishing • .. any materials • . . 
used in the construction •. • of any building •. . shall 
have a lien upon the property upon ... which they have 
. • • furnished ... materials • • • for the value of the ... 
materials ... furnished •••by each respectively, 
whether at the instance of the owner or any other person 
acting by his authority as ... contractor •.. This lien 
shall attach only to such interest as the owner may have 
in the property (Section 38- 1- 3 U.C.A. 1953) . 
. • • Within the twelve months . .. the lien claimant shall 
file for record ... a notice of the pendency of the 
action ... or the lien shall be void, except as to 
persons who have been made parties to the action and 
persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of 
the action . . . (Section 38-1-11 U.C.A. 1953) . 
It is plaintiff's position (a) that past Utah Supreme 
Court decisions require that a liberal interpretation must be 
given the mechanics' lien statute to protect matericilmen in 
their unpaid claims, -(b) that defendant had actual knowledge 
of plaintiffs claim and is therefore not absolved of liability 
even if plaintiff failed to file a lis pendens, and (c) that 
equity gives the plaintiff the right to transfer its lien to 
the proceeds of the sale of the property. 
Defendant counters with the argument (a) that plaintiff 
must strictly follow the statutes if it wishes to preserve its 
claim; (b) that defendant has no personal liability to 
plaintiff; and (c) that the case before the court is an action 
to foreclose a lien, the lien no longer exists and is void 
therefore this action should be dismissed as to this 
particular defendant. 
Basically the court must decide which of the two parties 
shall suffer the loss resulting from another parties failure 
-4-
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to pay a contractual obligation. This court thinks that 
plaintifffs position better reflects the purpose of the law 
and therefore rules that plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment should be granted. 
The Utah Supreme Court takes a rather strong position 
that the purpose of the mechanics1 lien statute is to protect 
those lienors who have added directly to the value of the 
property by furnishing materials upon it. Stanton 
Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah2d 184, 341 P2d 207 (1959), 
Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 P. 241 
(1917) . Also that such claims should not be defeated by legal 
technicalities or nice distinctions. Park City Meat Company 
v. Comstock Silver Mining Company, 36 Utah 145, 103 P2d 254 
(1909). 
The public purpose for the requirement of filing a lis 
pendens is to give notice to subsequent purchasers who lack 
actual notice, Smith v. Faris-Kesl Const. Co., 150 P. 25 
(Idaho 1915). In Harris-Dudley Plumbing Company v. 
Professional United World Travel Association, Inc,,592 P.2d 
586 (Utah 1979) the court preserved a foreclosure action on 
the liened property after it had been sold at a trust deed 
sale, because the president of the acquiring corporation was 
also president of the conveying corporation. Thus the court 
continued the protection of the lien law even when a lis 
-5-
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pendens had not been filed because the court ruled that the 
acquiring corporation had notice of the lien and came within 
the exception stated in Section 38-1-11* 
To adopt Defendants position that plaintifffs action is 
now void because the lien does not exist and defendant has no 
personal liability to plaintiff would require a very strict 
application of the mechanics lien statute. One would be 
required to ignore the exception contained in section 38-1-11 
that declares "except as to persons who have been made parties 
to the action and persons having actual knowledge of the 
commencement of the action". Such an interpretation is not in 
tune with the previous rulings on the law. 
In this case the defendant clearly had actual notice of 
plaintiff's lien when it sold the specific property to the 
present owner, Leon Peterson was in the best position to set 
the sale price and to take into account the potential loss to 
both Petersen and plaintiff. Plaintiff has a right to have 
its claim satisfied from the proceeds of the sale to the 
present owner, 
"It is well understood that when a person has a 
lien on land , , . and the holder of the legal 
title disposes of it to one who is an innocent 
purchaser for value and protected against such 
lien, the lienholder has the right in equity to 
have the court transfer his lien to what is 
received as the consideration for the sale . . . " 
Morgan Plan Co., Inc v. Bruce, 2 66 Ala. 49 4; 9 7 
So.2d 805 (1957). 
-6-
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Plaintiff established a position of priority when work 
was commenced on the property before defendant filed its trust 
deed (see Section 38-1-5 U.C.A. 1953). Equity dictates that 
the priority continues even though the real property has been 
sold. Judgment to issue for plaintiff in the sum of $4,240.73 
plus interest from January 13, 1989 (the date of sale to the 
present owner) and costs including a reasonable attorneys fee 
(limited to legal services required as to the issues between 
these parties) . 
DATED this /, day of inarch, 1990. 
Paul G, Gr$nt i 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of March, 1990, I 
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision to the folllowing: 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
David K. Broadbent, Esq, 
Thomas M. Melton, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
Kent B. Linebaugh 
Attorney for Defendants 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, I N C , , 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
JON L. McCLOY, dba McCLOY 
CONSTRUCTION, JAMES A. ARROWSMITH, 
PETERSON MORTGAGE CORPORATION, 
IDEAL CONCRETE CORPORATION, 
REIDfS CONCRETE SERVICE, INC., 
DAVIS BROTHERS CABINETMAKERS, 
INC., AND JOHN DOE I, 
Defendants. 
Defendant, Peterson Mortgage Corporation has objected to 
plaintiff's proposed order and summary judgment. 
Three points of defendants objections are well taken. 
First - Amount of lien. These two parties are creditors 
of a bankrupt owner and a deceased contractor. The defendant 
had no use of plaintiff's materials until such time as it 
foreclosed on its Trust Deed and resold the property to a 
third party. Defendant then became the constructive trustee 
of plaintiff's proceeds. This point was stated but not 
explained in the courts memorandum decision indicating that 
interest was to be allowed after January 13, 1990. The lien 
amount should be entered in the amount of $4,04 3.80. 
Second - Duplication of time and effort. There are 16 
incidents cited in counsels affidavit of attorney's fees 
covering inter-office conferences. Three attorneys and one 
legal assistant worked on the case. That such communication 
is essential and necessary within a large firm is unquestioned 
for the smooth operation of the firm. But those are internal 
matters which do not necessarily go to the question of what is 
a reasonable attorney's fee for the work required in any given 
case. Further, the nurturing of junior members of a firm by 
senior members should be an internal matter not a cost 
chargeable as a reasonable attorney's fee. The court will 
therefore require a reduction of*the fee in the sum of $350.00. 
Third - Preparation for oral argument. The court notes 
that almost $2,100.00 in fees were generated by the required 
research and preparation of written documents necessary to 
prosecute the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment . The 
court finds that 4 hours would be a reasonable time to 
assimilate that material and work product in preparation for 
oral argument plus an hour for court argument for a total of 5 
hours at $125*00 per hour. In counsels affidavit of 
attorney's fees there are five entries reflecting such 
preparation costs, i.e., September 11, 1989, October 3, 1989, 
October 13, 1989, November 1, 1989, and November 2, L989, for 
a total sum of $1,188.75. As above indicated this sum should 
be reduced to $625.00. Further, it was clearly established 
that defendants counsel did not receive notice of the first 
hearing date. Inasmuch as plaintiff requested oral argument 
on the motion, defendant should not be required to bear the 
burden of the expense of plaintiff's counsel attending when 
not receiving notice of the hearing date. But of course the 
time spend for preparation would still be useful at a 
subsequent hearing. Attorney's fees may therefore be allowed 
in the sum of $3,747.60. 
The finding of fact, conclusions of law and judgment 
should-be submitted in conformity to this decision. 
Dated this / !> day 
/ / 
Paul G. Grant 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision was mailed, postage prepaid to 
the below mentioned this day of May, 199 0. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
David K. Broadbent 
Thomas M. Melton 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
17 5 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
Kent B. Linebaugh 
Attorney for Defendants 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
David K. Broadbent (0442) 
Thomas M. Melton (4999) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
/ 
BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
JON L . McCLOY, d / b / a McCLOY 
CONSTRUCTION, JAMES A. 
ARROWSMITH, GAYLE Z. ARROWSMITH, 
PETERSON MORTGAGE CORPORATION, 
IDEAL CONCRETE CORPORATION, 
R E I D ' S CONCRETE S E R V I C E , I N C . , 
DAVIS BROTHERS CABINETMAKERS, 
I N C . , and JOHN DOE I , 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
' C i v i l N o . 8 8 3 0 0 3 8 2 5 C V 
J u d g e P a u l G r a n t 
PRINCE, YEATES 
4 Q6LOZAHLER 
Uty Centra J, Suite 000 
1 ft East Fourth South 
Salt L*k« a t y 
UUh 84111 
(801)524-1000 
On March 1, 1990, the Court issued its Memorandum 
Decision on plaintiff Butterfield Lumber, Ir.c.'s Motion for 
Summary Judgment. On June 15, 1990, the Court issued its 
Memoranajm Decision clarifying its prior decision and 
establishing the terms of the order and judgment in the 
above-captioned case. In accordance with those Memorandum 
Decisions, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Summary Judgment Motion of Plaintiff Butterfield Lumber, Inc., 
is hereby granted. 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and by reason of the 
premises aforesaid, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Butterfield 
Lumber recover from defendant Peterson Mortgage Corporation the 
following sums and amounts: 
(a) $4,043.80, the amount of plaintiff's mechanic's 
lien; 
(b) $569.80, interest at the statutory rate of 10%, 
from January 29, 1989, through June 30, 1990, plus per diem 
interest at the rate of $1.10 per day until the date of 
Judgment; 
(c) $3,747.60, attorneys1 fees as set forth in the 
Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees submitted with the proposed order 
and judgment and as set forth in the Court's Memorandum 
Decision dated June 15, 1990; 
(d) Interest on all sums due and owing after the date 
of judgment at the statutory rate until paid; 
(e) The judgment shall be augmented in the amount of 
reasonable costs and attorneys' fees expended in collecting 
said judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established 
by affidavit. 
PRINCE, YEATES 
4 QELOZAHLER 
City Centre t. Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City 
Utah 84111 
(801)524-1000 
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PRINCE, YEATES 
A QELOZAHLER 
C«tyOntr»| tSutt«900 
175 East Fourth South 
S*« Uke CUy 
Utah 84111 
(001)524.1000 
DATED tM. V day of July, 1990 
BY THE C^URT: 
Paul G. Grant 
District Court/Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that, on the day of July, 1990, 
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order and Judgment co the following: 
David K. Broadbent, Esq. 
Thomas M. Helton, Esq. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Kent B. Linebaugh, Esq. 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
370 East South Temple, £400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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